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ABSTRACT 
TOBIN WILLIAMSON: Mass Transit: Where Security and Sustainability Meet 
(Under the direction of Dr. Donald D. Searing) 
 
 
As it becomes apparent that increasing sustainability is a requirement to be a leading 
city in modern, globalized society, public and private actors are improving mass transit 
networks in cities around the world. At the same time, the threat of international terrorism is 
a security concern which must be addressed by modern cities, particularly those in Western 
countries like the United States and members of the European Union. This thesis looks at 
how mass transit, where sustainability and security converge, is dealing with these two 
realities of the twenty-first century, both of which have become significant issues only in 
recent decades. Brief histories of transit and terrorism are given prior to a more thorough 
analysis of security measures that have been taken by cities already, as well as some 
measures that could be taken in the future. 
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I. Introduction  
On 7 July 2005, London was shaken by one of the worst examples of modern 
terrorism, perhaps second only to 9/11 in its effects on Western psyche. Within a minute of 
each other, blasts on three separate trains disrupted Tube service and killed dozens (BBC – 
Bombing, 2005; Secretary of State, 2011, p.89). At the time, some 200,000 people were 
riding on over 500 trains within London’s Underground (BBC – Bombing, 2005). An hour 
later, another bomb was detonated on a bus, killing over a dozen more. Attacking mass 
transit was not without precedent; as will be explored later, it has happened multiple times in 
recent decades. However, the London Underground is arguably the world’s landmark metro 
system, and that so many casualties occurred generated tremendous worldwide attention to 
the vulnerability of transit networks to such attacks.  
Over the past few decades, international terrorism has become a significant security 
threat, especially to civilians in the United States and Europe. Consequently, security is now 
one of the driving issues of American and European politics. Terrorism itself is nothing new, 
though in the past it has mostly been based on things like separatist movements, ideological 
differences, power struggles, civil wars…domestic matters. Terrorists were from the 
countries they attacked, and their targets were often specific leaders or strategic sites. 
However, in the late twentieth century, a dramatic shift occurred. Attacks on the U.S. on 11 
September 2001 were the climax of this new era of international terrorism, frequently used 
by radical Islamic fundamentalists against civilians in European and American countries.  
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With that in mind, what are London and other major Western cities doing to ensure 
transit users are safe from this new phenomenon of international terrorism? The aim of this 
essay is to provide a comprehensive look at the situation of security in modern public transit 
networks in some of the cities most vulnerable to attacks. First, there will be a look at the 
import of mass transit in modern society. Second, a brief background on contemporary 
terrorism will be given, with specific examples of how it has impacted transit before. That 
will be followed by an examination of what has been done in light of these events. Finally, 
ideas on what could be done to prevent attacks in the future will be discussed. 
II. Transit  
This brief first section, an essential building block for the rest of the thesis, will show 
a) why sufficient public transportation is a necessity for modern global cities and b) 
quantitative information about modern transit networks. For a city to be successful in the 
twenty-first century, it is important for it to have sufficient public transit, for myriad reasons. 
According to Kim, Ulfarsson, and Hennessey, “public transit can potentially deliver 
congestion relief, reduced energy consumption, air quality improvement, and economic 
development” (2006, p.511). Similarly, Chavan, Peralta, and Steins cite traffic congestion, 
pollution, obesity, “increasing economic inequality and social isolation” as factors why 
transit is becoming more attractive to people (2007, p.3).What follows is a more thorough 
analysis of some of these factors.  
One of the most-argued, best-known reasons for using mass transit is that it is often 
more environmentally-sustainable than using automobiles. The logic for this argument is 
simple: it is far more efficient to carry thirty people on one bus than thirty people in thirty 
cars, for example. With gas prices increasing and gas supply decreasing, this factor will 
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continue to grow (even if climate change is false, as some skeptics claim). Since this 
argument for mass transit is so well-known, little time will be spent on it here. 
Many have discussed how auto-dependency contributes to decline of social cohesion 
(Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and Speck, 2000; Leinberger, 2007; Mapes, 2009; Owen, 2009). 
When people hop in their private automobiles, they isolate themselves from anyone else not 
in the car with them. Yet on transit, people interact with others from all socioeconomic 
backgrounds, exchanging ideas, thoughts, and just simple conversation with people they 
might otherwise never encounter. “People who want to understand democracy,” said Simeon 
Strunsky, “should spend less time in the library with Aristotle and more time on the buses 
and in the subway” (Lummis, 1996, p.8). This idea extends to social networks in addition to 
face-to-face interaction: one recent study confirms younger generations prefer using their 
phones on public transit to the private activity of driving their own automobiles, and are 
increasingly choosing the former instead (Badger, 2013).  
Furthermore, there are often economic incentives for using mass transit. The 
purchase, insurance, and upkeep of private automobiles cost thousands of dollars per year. In 
cities large enough to support mass transit, parking is usually quite expensive. Increased 
pedestrian traffic usually encourages economic and housing development around transit hubs 
and stations, stimulating local business and cultural life. Indeed, “commuters, tourists, and 
transit-related businesses are indicators of a community’s economic vitality” (Waugh, 2004, 
p.307). Hartong, Goel, and Wijesekera (2008) address the importance of rail transit (of both 
people and goods) on the American economy in particular. 
Additionally, there are many health benefits for using public transit, as most people 
walk from their jobs, residences, or other destinations to transit stops. In fact, switching from 
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automobile-based transportation to public transportation to commute to work results in an 
average weight loss of six pounds per year, according to one 2010 study (Alleyne, 2010). 
Many cities have implemented programs which specifically point out and encourage the 
benefits of walking on riders’ commute to work (Copeland, 2008).  
Finally, transit networks often play a significant role in shaping a city’s identity. Gift 
shops containing posters and t-shirts of network maps can be found in cities with famous 
systems, like London, Paris, Washington, and New York. Fecht explains that “no two 
subway systems have the same design… Each system’s design is the result of many factors, 
including local geography, the city’s layout and traffic distribution, politics, culture and 
degree of urban planning” (2012). In one example, a magazine described the elaborate, 
ornate “twenty-nine uniquely designed stations” of the subway system of the Uzbek capital 
as “the jewel in the crown of the new Tashkent… for the city’s inhabitants it is a mark of 
pride, and for the foreign tourist, the object of envy and marvel” (Coffey, 2011). Other cities 
– Prague, Boston, Montreal, Stockholm, to name just a few – have unique stations filled with 
artwork, which serve as tourist destinations themselves. There is also a prestige factor that 
comes with having a great public transit network; according to famous urban planner and 
economist Richard Florida, the “mark of a great global city is you can get where you want 
[without] a car” (2013). 
Despite these benefits, however, if people do not feel secure whilst riding on public 
transportation, they are not very likely to use it. Gunilla Fransson says “with an increasingly 
complex and vulnerable transport environment, there is a growing need for solutions that can 
offer a higher level of safety and efficiency” (Saab Group, 2010). Fransson is a security 
expert at Saab, who is contracted to run security on Prague’s metro network (Saab Group, 
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2010). The Czech capital has fortunately not been subjected to a significant terrorist incident 
on its public transportation network; however, as will now be seen, many other Western 
cities have not been so lucky. 
III. Terrorism 
Now that groundwork for the import of public transit has been established, it is time 
to address the next component of the essay: the need for adequate security on those European 
and American public transit networks. Would it not be easy for terrorists to bring explosive 
devices onto packed, rush-hour trains and create massive casualties? After all, subway, bus, 
and light rail networks do not have the level of extensive security checks or screenings as 
airports do. Think of how many people carry bags, suitcases, and backpacks onto trains; why 
has this not been exploited more often than it has been? Furthermore, what changed in cities 
that were attacked? What changes were made in other cities as precautionary measures? 
What makes terrorism so concerning is that all it takes is just one event, just one lapse in 
security from the authorities, for attackers to be successful. In the days following the 
Brighton bombing in 1984, the IRA summed up the situation perfectly: “Remember we only 
have to be lucky once; you will have to be lucky always” (Taylor, 2002, p.265). 
Consequently, securing transit has been an increasingly-important concern in this era of the 
modern international terrorism that has developed over the past generation or two.  
Sadly, terrorist attacks in the Middle East are viewed as routine by many Westerners. 
It often takes one in a place like New York or London or Madrid to make Westerners realise 
they, too, are vulnerable. When these attacks do happen, there are often harsh reactionary 
measures taken. In the decade since 9/11, it has often been lamented how airport security 
screening measures have become such a hassle for travelers: no liquids in carry-ons, 
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excessive pat-downs, x-ray scanners, shoe removal, long security and customs lines, etc. 
Entire books have been written which argue that post-911 security has been gone about the 
wrong way (Molotch, 2012). 
Attacks on Westerners by radical Islamists are nothing new; jihad has been taking 
place for over a millennia. Hopkirk (1994) offers a brilliant volume on how certain peoples 
of central Asia – in modern Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, etc. – have a history of being 
hostile toward Europeans. Even today there are tensions in the areas where Islamic and 
European cultures meet, with many place names becoming buzzwords for tension, crime, 
danger: Beslan, Grozny, Srebrenica, etc. This conflict of cultures and boundaries has existed 
for centuries (Hopkirk, 1994), and Russia is one country has recently implemented harsher 
measures to quell tensions again (Barry, 2013). 
However, recent decades have seen two major changes from traditional conflict. First, 
these events have moved from attacks on Westerners visiting places like Kabul and Bukhara 
to attacks on Westerners living in places like London and New York. Second, in the past, if a 
nation was attacked, the aggressor was likely the army of another sovereign nation, led or at 
least approved by the head of that state. In modern terrorism, belligerents from many 
countries cooperate across borders, outside state authority, as the new century’s events in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. have shown. This sort of underground guerilla warfare is a 
relatively new type of conflict that subsequently requires new tactics and strategies. The 
Moscow attack in 2004, for example, was the work of Abu Walid, a Saudi who financed 
Chechen rebels in Russia (Windrem, 2010), and 9/11 was a multinational effort carried out, 
planned, and financed by many nationalities in many different countries.  
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In July 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Officer issued a report saying 
“high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location in large 
metropolitan areas or tourist destinations” make rail and transit networks key targets (Stoller, 
2010). According to the British government, there exists a “global risk of indiscriminate 
terrorist attacks which could be in public areas” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2013).As 
mentioned earlier, 7/7 showed just how vulnerable mass transit can be; the attackers walked 
nonchalantly and undetected into the tube on a weekday rush hour, explosives in backpacks. 
It happened then, so why not again? 
By their nature, “subways are meant to be open and easily accessible” (Murphy, 
2005). Cox, Prager, and Rose claim “mass transit modes concentrate large numbers of people 
in confined and often low-security areas” (2009, p.307), and Clarke adds: “tens of thousands 
of people push through essentially unguarded portals in short periods of time” (2004, p.2). 
Yet Parker explains “commuters’ expectations that public transit take them a few miles with 
minimal inconvenience makes it impossible to implement in subways the strict screening that 
exists in airports” (2010). This open and accessible nature of public transportation can be 
both a blessing and a curse; “How easy it is to waltz into a teeming station 10 minutes before 
departure, pull your ticket from a machine and glide onto the train without any inspection of 
your ID or your bags” (Ripley et al., 2004, p.36). Businessmen with briefcases; tourists with 
luggage; jihadists with bombs; there is no screening measure in place to check. Ten bags 
used in the Madrid bombings of 2004 caused around 200 deaths and 15,000 casualties 
(Clarke, 2004, p.2) in “what many intelligence analysts describe as the most significant 
terrorist attack since September 11” (Windrem, 2010). Waugh summarizes:  
“Transit systems are dependent upon ridership for a significant portion of their 
funding. Ridership is heavily influenced by convenience and speed. Metal 
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detectors and other measures that slow access and reduce convenience may 
discourage ridership, which can have a serious impact upon the financial 
viability of transit systems… The choice of commuter rail and subway 
systems over private automobiles may be swayed if security precautions slow 
travel time by more than a few minutes” (2004, p.310). 
 
Yet the risk of terrorism cannot simply be ignored solely for the sake of convenience, 
can it? It is a pressing concern that must be considered as a key security issue of the twenty-
first century. Waugh points out “recent bombings of train and bus stations [and] trains and 
buses… are evidence that precautions need to be implemented to reduce the threat to those 
modes of mass transit” (2004, p.311). The chart below, showing the number of terrorist 
attacks on transit throughout the world and made by Italian public transportation agency 
ASSTRA, clearly shows terrorism has been increasing: 
 
(Source: Bocchetti, et al., 2009, p.1.) 
The chart cuts off before 2005; however, Stoller (2010) provides additional 
information after that time. Between 1 January 2005 and 30 June 2010, subways and trains 
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saw 213 attacks in over twenty countries, resulting in 700 deaths and over 3,000 injuries. By 
comparison, there were 197 attacks on planes and airports, with 238 killed and 937 injured 
(Stoller, 2010). Clark Ervin, former inspector general for the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, said “Logic dictates that because mass transit is ‘mass,’ terrorists are interested in 
attacking it to maximize death, injury and panic” (Stoller, 2010). John Pistole, new TSA 
administrator in Obama’s administration, said “some terrorist groups see rail and subways as 
being more vulnerable, because there's not the type of screening that you find in aviation” 
(Stoller, 2010). Discussing the issue of transit terrorism, Chalk describes it succinctly:  
“We don't know when or where, but terrorists will certainly use this same 
method of attack again – and the odds will likely grow as tougher security at 
airports makes it harder to attack planes. A full 42 percent of all terrorist 
attacks between 1991 and 2001 were directed against mass transit systems, 
according to a Brookings Institution study” (2006).  
 
A balanced security continuum must be reached, because “as you harden one target, 
others become more appealing” (Murphy, 2005). Israel is an example: “El Al employs 
legendary security measures, so terrorists do not bother trying to hit Israeli jetliners. Instead 
they target malls, buses, and nightclubs” (Murphy, 2005). Could this end up being the case in 
Western countries, as well? There has not been an airline successfully brought down by 
terrorists since 9/11, but there have clearly been notable attacks on public transit. “The 
casualties are lower,” says Murphy, “but there are still casualties” (2005). 
Before the recent era of international terrorism, which began around 15-20 years ago, 
domestic terrorism existed in some Western cities. Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and Fink claim 
that London residents have become accustomed to the threat of terrorism due to the presence 
of IRA activities in the latter twentieth century (2006, p.735). Spain, also, has a long history 
of terrorism due to the Basque separatist group, ETA (p.739).  After the Tokyo subway attack 
10 
 
in 1995, Presidential Decision Directive 63 – concerning protection of critical infrastructure 
– was issued in the United States by President Clinton (Waugh, 2004, p.308). Prior to 9/11, 
the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh was the deadliest example of peace-time 
terrorism on American soil.  
Yet the 9/11 attacks were a turning point in international security; “As the buildings 
crumbled, so did the taken-for-granted idea that no such thing could happen” (Molotch, 2012, 
p.7). The game changed, and the world is still dealing with the consequences. Domestic 
terrorism still exists; in March 2010, female suicide bombers in Moscow killed 38 on the 
subway (Weber, 2010), and France, Italy, and Spain have also all seen examples of domestic, 
separatist-based terrorism in recent years (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2013). 
However, the main concern for many these days are threats from “Others,” in particular 
radical Muslim jihadists who target Westerners. This has largely been brought about by 
globalisation and rapid advances in technology. It is important to note –as Cox, Prager, and 
Rose do – that terrorists are able and quite willing to adjust their tactics to new technologies 
or targets to suit their advantage (2009, p.307). There is no room for complacency; one 
breach in security could result in catastrophe.  
Consequently, all major international events must consider security risks. It cost $1.5 
billion to secure the Athens Olympics in 2004, according to Samatas, six times higher than 
the cost in the games four years earlier in Sydney (2011, p.3361), the last pre-9/11 Olympics. 
The International Olympic Committee requires host sites to have precautionary anti-terrorism 
policies in place (Samatas, 2011, p.3349). Having video surveillance in and around stadiums 
is required for applicant cities hoping to host the World Cup (Eick, 2011, p.3337). This 
shows “security of any post-9/11 international mega event, like the Olympics, the World 
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Cup, and G8 meetings, is based on new anti-terrorist security solutions,” such as CCTV,  
which are run “by a close transnational collaboration of state police and militaries, alongside 
the tracking, targeting and profiling of suspect individuals, places, behaviour, associations, 
and groups” (Samatas, 2011, p.3350). For the past decade or so, the World Cup’s influence 
has extended out of the stadia into the surrounding areas, such as “main infrastructure 
(airports, railway stations, etc.) and accommodation sites (hotels, training centers, etc.)” 
(Eick, 2011, p.3332). 
Yet it was not just enormous, occasional global events that were affected. The U.S. 
and its European allies became involved in two long, costly, violent wars, one of which is 
still going. Many transatlantic alliances became strained to levels of tension unseen in 
decades. The lives of travelers everywhere were changed; speaking while assuming his 
companions had successfully carried out a terrorist attack against a large shopping center by 
using anthrax, a fictional terrorist on the television program Criminal Minds said “What has 
happened tonight will affect your economy for years, the same way 9/11 affected air travel!” 
(Criminal Minds, 2006). 
It is true that successful terrorist attacks in Western cities are fairly rare. However, 
their psychological and logistical effects can be disproportionately strong, and for as many 
successful attacks have occurred, there have been as many unsuccessful ones. In late 2010, 
for example, multinational security forces uncovered plots based in Pakistan to launch 
attacks in Britain, France, and Germany that were similar to the one in Mumbai which killed 
over 160 people in 2008 (Norton-Taylor and Bowcott, 2010). In the United States, there have 
been at least six plots to attack American subway and rail networks 9/11, primarily in 
Washington and New York City (Stoller, 2010). The effects on citizens’ psyche cannot be 
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ignored, as the psychological effects of terrorism can impact a population just as much as 
actual attacks (Bugliarello, 2003, p.503). Security parties and civilians must remain vigilant 
and resist complacency. “Make no mistake about it,” said New York’s mayor Michael 
Bloomberg after a foiled attempt at a subway bombing in 2010, “we have to work very hard 
to keep this subway system safe” (Long, 2010).   
But where is the line separating where people feel safe from where they feel 
oppressed? Murphy says “as long as most of the public believes—even wrongly—that 
random searches make them safer,” discussing one type of security measure, “the searches 
could be a plus” (2005). In the days after 9/11, “National Guard troops in airports with no 
bullets in their guns were a good idea. The psychological component is very important and 
shouldn't be minimized” (Murphy, 2005). This essay will now take a look at some ways 
different cities have tried to provide security – whether real or perceived– for their transit 
passengers. 
IV. What Has Been Done 
If relevant parties hope to encourage use of alternative transportation, they must 
ensure riders remain safe; if people do not feel secure, they will choose other options. The 
key question, then, is: what can be done to ensure public transit systems are as secure as 
possible, and ready to handle the consequences of terrorist attacks? Following the detonation 
of smoke bombs in the city’s subway in 2012, Montreal’s mayor Gérald Tremblay described 
the problem:  
“Do you want me to take 4,600 policemen and women and put them in the 
subway? You want me to close the subway? What do you want me to do? Are 
we going to stop living because we have a crisis on our hands? No. What's the 
solution? That's the question’” (Gollom, 2012). 
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That is the question, indeed. This section will look at measures taken by various governments 
and transit authorities to address security threats caused by twenty-first century terrorism.  
At first glance, the outlook might not be very optimistic. Security specialist and 
journalist Richard Clarke claims “terrorists, if they did surveillance, would know that 
security hasn't really improved since 9/11” (Ross, 2009). Another former official said “I hear 
people saying it is virtually impossible to make public transport in the U.S. secure… That's 
wrong. It is impossible” (Ripley et al., 2004, p.36). Another concern is that knee-jerk 
reactions following attacks only highlight existing security weaknesses (Parker, 2010).Yet on 
the other hand, riding has statistically never been safer. “Crime is down in the subways, even 
as ridership increases. In 1990, there were about 50 crimes a day reported in the subway” in 
New York, “and now there are about five, according to police” (Long, 2010). Riding transit 
is much safer than being on the roads in a car; a person even has greater chances of being 
struck by lightning than killed in the subway (Grabar, 2013).  
However, fear of crime remains an obstacle, despite national decline in crime rates 
over the past couple decades (Yavuz and Welch, 2010, p.2492). Murphy claims “you've got 
to convince people that they are being protected, without scaring them so much that their 
anxiety shuts down the city” (2005). Occasionally the public becomes aware of specific risks 
or foiled attacks, but there is more they do not know. “If enemies know where… emergency 
headquarters are located,” says Molotch, “they can zap it, bringing everything down. If 
access to emergency data is free and open, miscreants can get hold of that” (2012, p.5). Yet 
does the public not have a right to know when they are at risk and what to do if something 
happens? Governments do not want to induce panic, but they should induce precaution and 
vigilance, and let riders know security is taken seriously. Spokesman Kevin Ortiz said 
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“safety and security of our customers is the MTA's top priority… In a post-9/11 world we 
have worked together to harden our infrastructure, secure sensitive areas” (Long, 2010). 
While Francois Rambaud of the French Ministry of Transportation feels “security has 
become more of a goal than the reality,” he says the aim of security should be “create a 
feeling of security rather than reduce the risk to zero, which is practically impossible” 
(Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and Fink, 2006, p.731). In all this, “the dilemma,” says Molotch, 
is that “holding information secret also prevents people from knowing what to do when they 
might be of help” (2012, p.5). 
Another hurdle to overcome is funding, especially in the United States, where the 
focus of anti-terrorism efforts since 9/11 has overwhelmingly been in aviation (2004, p.307). 
There were over 10 billion trips made on American transit systems in 2009, yet a 108-page 
security review by the Department of Homeland Security the next year mentioned subways 
only once (Parker, 2010). $4.5 billion of federal money was spent on aviation security in 
2004 compared to just $65 million on rail, “even though five times as many people take 
trains as planes every day” (Ripley et al., 2004, p.36). Despite all this, many security 
measures for mass transit have been enacted, as will now be shown. 
These days, closed-circuit television, or CCTV, is arguably the most prominent type 
of security technology (Yavuz and Welch, 2010, p.2497). CCTV is used by most if not all 
subway systems in the world. Atlanta, Los Angeles, Miami, and Washington have all 
conducted studies showing CCTV is “helpful in improving transit security and reducing fear 
of crime in transit passengers who are waiting at train stations or bus stops, or riding transit 
vehicles” (Yavuz and Welch, 2010, p.2498). London is perhaps the world’s most surveilled 
city; its Underground has over 6,000 cameras, yet this sort of “intrusion of privacy for 
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security reasons is generally accepted by the British people” (Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and 
Fink, 2006, p.737). CCTV has become commonplace in London and elsewhere in Britain 
because, simply, it works. In the 1990s, new CCTV technology enabling facial recognition 
became “perhaps the most striking use of technology in London’s Olympic Boroughs” 
(Coaffee, Fussey, and Moore, 2011). At the turn of the millennium, one Scotland Yard 
spokesperson claimed the arrest of nail bomber David Copeland “highlighted once more the 
role of the closed-circuit television camera as a crime-fighting weapon” (BBC – CCTV, 
2000).  
One of the largest expansions of CCTV technology came in the mid-2000s as myriad 
cities in Germany were preparing to host the 2006 World Cup. At the turn of the millennium, 
just four German cities used CCTV; by May 2006, around thirty did (Töpfer, 2007). The 
impact of the World Cup on security on transit in German cities was significant. It created 
“modernisation, enduring expansion and centralisation of CCTV systems in the hosting 
sports stadia, at the railway stations and in urban public transport networks... host cities of 
the World Cup invested millions of euros to monitor railway stations and subway stations as 
well as the interiors of trains, subways, streetcars and buses” (Eick, 2011, p.3337). Frankfurt 
and Hamburg added CCTV to all subway trains and stations. Stuttgart “extended its existing 
surveillance infrastructure to provide central monitoring for the city’s transport network 
within a30-kilometre radius around the football stadium” (Eick, 2011, p.3337-3338). 2/3 of 
the cameras installed in Kaiserslautern remained in operation after the tournament ended 
(Schmitt, 2006).  
Whereas Germany took a proactive approach, CCTV is often implemented or 
enhanced as a security method reactively after attacks occur. Following the Aum Shinrikyo 
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sarin attack in 1995, some 2,200 cameras were installed in Tokyo’s subway stations “at 
strategic points covering different platform areas, ticket gates, and restrooms” (Loukaitou-
Sideris, Taylor, and Fink, 2006, p.735). In Madrid, for another example, cameras were 
retrofitted “with anti-intrusion and detection systems,” with more added following the March 
2004 attacks (p.740).  In Paris, attacks “by Algerian terrorists in 1995 led to considerable 
reflection about how to better protect transit systems,” such as CCTV (2006, p.730). An 
NYPD spokesperson said “as cameras proliferate, as we build more of them, they become 
more instrumental in solving crimes. They also act as a deterrent” (Long, 2010).  
Of course, CCTV has its flaws. While efficient CCTV “systems have the potential to 
substantially facilitate post-incident investigations” (Chalk, 2006) and are often effective in 
identifying perpetrators once they commit an attack, they does not always prevent attacks 
from happening (Yavuz and Welch, 2010, p.2498). Also, for CCTV to be effective, the 
cameras must be efficient and in working order. In 2010, it was found that around half of the 
4,300+ cameras in New York’s subway system did not work at all: 2,270 did, 2,043 did not. 
This led Mayor Bloomberg to caution “maybe someday we’re going to get very badly hurt 
because of it” (Long, 2010). 
Speaking of New York, NYPD performs random bag searches throughout the city 
(Long, 2010), which came about after the first confirmed threat against the MTA in 
September 2005 (Murphy, 2005). A random bag inspection policy was implemented in 
Washington in December 2010 (Stoller, 2010). Some cities – such as New York, Los 
Angeles, Washington, and Boston – randomly search not just bags, but also passengers 
(Gollom, 2012), as do many northeastern U.S. Amtrak stations. This procedure has actually 
been advocated by the TSA in place of the kind of universal screening seen in airports 
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(Stoller 2010). However, selecting only random passengers instead of all of them is hardly 
foolproof. “There's a chance that a bomber will get through… the potential bomber is a 
needle in a human haystack. The cops' goal is a psychological one,” says Murphy (2005). 
One member of NYPD claimed their goal was to “keep them thinking that they may be 
searched at any time and any place” (Murphy, 2005). In Beijing’s subway, however, all bags 
are screened (Neumann, 2012); it would be interesting to see how this strategy would work in 
Western cities. 
Another anti-terrorism tool is practice; “regular testing of existing security protocols 
to identify gaps and loopholes would also be useful,” explains Chalk (2006).  Similar to fire 
or tornado drills, some cities have implemented attack drills to prepare. In October 2003, for 
example, a nerve gas attack in the Paris Metro was staged by French authorities (Loukaitou-
Sideris, Taylor, and Fink, 2006, p.731), and in the summer of 2012, the Department of 
Homeland Security tested new sensors in Boston’s MBTA by releasing harmless bacteria 
which would be registered by the sensors (Anderson, 2012). Preparation for attacks “places 
huge demands on training; for instance, subway operators need to be trained to understand 
the fundamental difference between actions required in a fire and those required in a 
biological or poison attack” (Bugliarello, 2003, p.504). However, if lives are saved, those 
demands would be worth it. 
 One way of gathering information on users are “Smart Card” systems. Portable, 
durable, and small, smart cards have been replacing traditional ticket cards in an increasing 
number of European cities – “especially in France, the U.K., and Italy” – as well as “being 
extensively used in Asia” (Pelletier, Trepanier, and Morency, 2011, p.559). They are also 
found in over a dozen metropolitan areas in the Americas, from San Francisco to Santiago 
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(p.559). Some of the world’s most famous mass transit networks have smart cards that are 
instantly recognizable; London’s Oyster, Washington’s SmarTrip, Boston’s CharlieCard, etc. 
By using a microchip that serves as a sort of memory card (p. 558), these systems “produce 
large quantities of very detailed data on onboard transactions’” (p.557), from fingerprints to 
medical data to photo ID, depending on how extensive the chip is (p.588). The smart cards 
can also be used for purchases of things other than just passenger fares, such as parking fees 
and retail transactions (p.559), and also reloadable, which increases convenience for the 
consumer, and tracking information for authorities if needed. Additionally, many services 
offer discounted rates for passengers who use smart cards, therefore providing an additional 
incentive. Bugliarello says “a key need for each city is for an integrated model capable of 
identifying the complex interactions among its systems, their vulnerabilities, the means for 
addressing them, and also the ability to provide real-time guidance to first responders” (2003, 
p.506); smart cards go a long way in achieving this, though not surprisingly there are 
associated privacy concerns voiced by some critics (Pelletier, Trepanier, and Morency, 2011, 
p.559). 
Oslo has a five-line subway system with over one hundred stations and a daily 
ridership of over 200,000. Around a decade ago, the Oslo Metro Company “started to ask 
ourselves whether we should really focus all our resources on the handful of people who 
cause damage or the other approximately 200,000 people who don’t,” according to one 
spokesperson. Consequently, Oslo began practicing what many cities do now: their security 
switched from “standing at remote stations waiting for something bad to happen” to having 
security personnel with significant presence at subway hubs (Securitas, 20--).  In addition to 
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changing policies, Oslo Metro Company’s security changed their looks, too. According to 
security contractor Securitas,  
“Boots and batons have been banned. Instead, the team of approximately 60 
security officers wear slacks, dress shirts and ties; carry mobile phones and a 
first-aid kit; keep handcuffs out of sight; receive training in conflict 
management [and] practical ethnic issues; and are recruited to reflect the 
Oslo’s demographics in terms of age, gender and ethnicity” (Securitas, 20--). 
 
Uniformed presence is a crucial security component. London’s Underground has over 
six hundred British Transport Police officers in highly noticeable blue uniforms patrolling its 
Tube stations (Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and Fink, 2006, p.737). In Copenhagen, officers 
called metrostewards serve as public faces and liaisons for the metro (Municipality of 
Ørestad, 1999). This strategy has proven to be effective. Yavuz and Welch explain: “Simply 
increasing staff presence, especially uniformed staff, in stations and stops [aids] in feelings of 
personal safety due to increased transit information availability and surveillance; passengers 
have reported more fear when such staff are not visible” (2010, p.2498).  
As with other security options, increased police presence often occurs following 
attacks. After one in Moscow left over three dozen dead in 2010, Washington and New York 
increased security on their own respective systems. In D.C., “teams of officers and bomb-
sniffing dogs [conducted] random, precautionary sweeps through rail yards and the system’s 
86 stations” and “transit police officers [were] on ‘high visibility patrols,’” whereas in New 
York, “special units distinguished by their black uniforms, helmets and body armor also were 
assigned to monitor” America’s busiest subway (Weber, 2010). Additional patrols were 
added in Tokyo following the sarin attacks of 1995 and in Madrid following the bombings in 
2004 (Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and Fink, 2006, p.734). After Madrid, TSA created VIPR 
teams – “Visual Intermodal Prevention and Response”— random, unannounced, and 
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noticeable officers in select transit facilities like subway, train, and bus stations throughout 
the United States (Patterson, 2012; Stoller, 2010). Fifteen existing VIPR units conducted 
around 4,000 operations in 2010, though there have been plans to expand in recent years 
“after intelligence from Osama bin Laden's Pakistan compound revealed al Qaeda plans to 
target U.S. rail systems on the tenth anniversary of 9/11” (Patterson, 2012).  
However, it is important not to go overboard or create feelings of a police state. One 
way to lighten the burden of security and transit officials is by having passengers help. Brian 
Jenkins, “director of the national transportation security centre at the Mineta Transportation 
Institute, … stresses the importance of getting riders involved in their own security” 
(Gollom, 2012). According to U.K. security minister Lord West of Spithead, “the thing that 
causes fear is ignorance of things” (The Scotsman, 2008). By training civilians, civic 
authorities can have people besides officials prepared for attacks. Denver has implemented 
what they call Transit Watch: “From increased patrols and electronic surveillance, to 
unannounced security sweeps of RTD vehicles and facilities, we take every precaution to 
ensure the security of our vehicles and passengers” (Regional Transportation District, 2012). 
“CERT” – Community Emergency Response Team – is a three-day training certification for 
citizens “with basic-level training from homeland security experts,” covering topics ranging 
from first aid to evacuation procedures, and is one part of Denver’s plan (Regional 
Transportation District, 2012). A CERT program is also offered in Washington (Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 2012). Chalk advocates that employees, too, should 
undergo awareness education in order to “be equipped with a decision-making framework 
that they can apply to assess potentially dangerous and suspicious situations without having 
to be an expert in threat identification” (2006). 
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Similarly, many cities both in the United States and Europe have implemented “if you 
see something, say something” awareness programs (Bay Area Rapid Transit, 2012; Chicago 
Transit Authority, 2012; Dou, 2010; Gollom, 2012; Regional Transportation District, 2012). 
This has long been the case in London, which has a history of terrorist activity on transit; 
“people are so vigilant and raise the alarm so frequently,” claim Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, 
and Fink, “that London Underground has to deal with reports of about 10,000 unattended 
items every month” (2006, p.738). Greg Hull of the American Public Transit Association 
said “whether it’s Washington Metro, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, virtually all 
the public transit systems have adopted the concepts of public awareness, public 
engagement” (Kaiser, 2011).  
Passengers can see suspicious activity, but they also see poor conditions in their 
surroundings. In 2012, New York’s MTA worked on increasing security presence in its 
stations “for the mutual benefit of riders and the agency,” though the aim was primarily to 
combat fare evaders, not terrorists (Flagenheimer, 2012). New York is well-known for its 
idea of fighting big crime by going after small crime first, the “broken windows theory,” 
which is that “perceptions of insecurity are determined by the ‘messages’ people get from the 
signs of neighbourhood disorder: if no one cares that these happen, then anything could 
happen here; the place is not safe” (Yavuz and Welch, 2010, p.2496). According to New 
York City’s vice-president of security Vincent DeMarino, “Those of us who believe 
emphatically in the broken windows theory feel that when they go after the little things like 
fare evasion, big things are also taken care of” (Flagenheimer, 2012). In other words, “If the 
physical environment is neglected, bad social behaviour starts. A well maintained physical 
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environment on the other hand signals that the common values of society apply in that area” 
– this is the official policy of Denmark’s Municipality of Ørestad (1999).   
Finally, station designs themselves have been changed to adjust to the threat of 
terrorism. Improved station design is one component of “reducing the vulnerability of the 
national rail and London Underground systems,” according to the United Kingdom’s official 
Strategy for Countering Terrorism (Secretary of State, 2011, p.81). British examples include 
eliminating “places where people can conceal explosives without being noticed. Vending 
machines and telephone booths are built with sloping tops, so that nothing can be hidden on 
top of them,” and in some cases, “trash cans are completely banned in some stations or 
replaced with receptacles that have a plastic ring holding a bin of see-through plastic” 
(Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and Fink, 2006, p.738).  Similar measures were implemented by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2004 (Stein, 2004, p.17), one reason being 
“plastic is less likely to emit deadly pieces of shrapnel should an explosive device go off in 
one” (Chalk, 2006). In Washington, bins, vending machines, and storage lockers were 
removed from Metro stations after 9/11, with similar justifications used in Britain and New 
York (Waugh, 2004, p.312), suggestions that Chalk claims should be implemented 
universally at all transit stations (2006). Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and Fink explain how 
design changes can be seen in Paris: 
“The environment and context of the [newer] stations are quite different from 
the rest… Absent are the narrow, mazelike access ways and tunnels to the 
platforms and exit doors that twist and turn at odd angles that characterize the 
older stations, and inhibit police response to a terrorist attack. There are few 
curves to obstruct sight lines, and passenger waiting and walking areas are 
large, giving better opportunities for surveillance. Station construction 
materials are mostly transparent, reflective, and resistant to graffiti or 
vandalism. There is maximum use of direct natural or indirect artificial light” 
(2006, p.732). 
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V. What Could Be Done 
The final thesis section will look at possible actions that could be taken in the future 
in order to improve security on public transit networks in Western cities. There is a clear 
concern that exists among both the general public and authorities. One of the four main goals 
of the United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism for 2011-15 is to “reduce the 
vulnerability of the transport network” (Secretary of State, 2011, p.13), while Clarke writes 
that “in New York City, with more than 4 million rail and subway commuters daily, security 
has become an obsession” (Clarke, 2004, p.2). So, in addition to the methods that are already 
in place, what else could be done to ensure that transit systems are as secure as possible?  
For one, services should be more efficient. Yavuz and Welch claim that reliability 
and punctuality influence feelings of security (2010, p.2497). The authors cite three 
components to this: 1) being frequent, 2) being on-time, and 3) knowledge of when the next 
service is coming. This explains why “frequent and on-time service may help passengers to 
feel more secure by reducing uncertainty and the length of time that individuals spend 
waiting in [intimidating] environments” (Yavuz and Welch, 2010, p.2498). As anyone who 
has flown could explain, though, increasing security often means the exact opposite of 
punctuality and efficiency. Yet high-speed trains in Spain now screen passengers in areas 
similar to those used in airports. Officials say it “is a great method from the security point of 
view. And contrary to what we thought when we implemented it, passengers appreciate it as 
something good that makes them feel calmer” (Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and Fink, 2006, 
p.740).  Amtrak, the U.S. passenger rail network, checks passenger names with government 
watchlists after deciding metal detectors would not be worth the cost or inconvenience 
(Ripley et al., 2004, p.37). In 2002, TSA Security Chief Richard Bennis stated that 
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“ultimately you are going to see some level of baggage screening” on Amtrak (Peckenbaugh, 
2002, p.75), though Amtrak’s police chief Ernest Frazier believed “there is some gate control 
that may work, but we are just not going to be able to set up a checkpoint kind of system” 
(Peckenbaugh, 2002, p.75).  
Yet inter-city rail is different than intra-city subways. Surely each passenger coming 
into the subway cannot be screened individually; this would create a logistical nightmare far 
worse than anything at airports, which in turn would kill viability of using public transit. 
Brian Jenkins said it would cost $8-10 per passenger to screen transit like is done at airports. 
“If you add that cost to a subway fare,” he said, “it would destroy public transportation” 
(Stoller, 2010). In addition to added costs, there would be tremendous added time. “People 
may be willing to wait in line to undergo security at airports or cross-country flights,” said 
Jenkins, “But to impose that kind of wait on a system where you take a 15-minute, 20-minute 
ride two times a day is not realistic… costs would be prohibitive and the delays involved 
would essentially destroy convenient surface transportation” (Gollom, 2012). Murphy 
believes screening transit this way is not only inconvenient, but could be dangerous: 
“The surest way to protect the subway system from bombs would be to screen 
every passenger's bag. But that would not only be enormously expensive in 
terms of time and manpower, it could have a human cost. The subways would 
become very inconvenient to ride, more people would drive cars, and there'd 
be more fatal road accidents. That's not to mention that the long lines of riders 
waiting to get screened would pose a tempting target” (2005). 
 
Former U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman, ex-chair of the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, put it bluntly: “Rail and transit security will never achieve 
the level of security that exists at airports” (Stoller, 2010). Even if a quick screen process 
could be introduced, mass transit could still be vulnerable in other ways. “An explosive 
device could be placed in subway or rail cars when they're out of service in a train yard,” 
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explains Stoller, or “the rails, bridges and tunnels they ride on or pass through could be 
sabotaged” (2010).That being said, efforts should still be made to achieve as much security 
as possible. Additionally, the current administration seems much more concerned about 
protecting public transit than the previous one was; Kristin Lee of the TSA said “the Obama 
administration has made extraordinary investments in surface transportation security” since 
he took office, allocating almost one billion dollars for it (Stoller, 2010). 
What else other than increased screening measures could be useful, though? People 
are increasingly reliant on mobile devices, like smart phones or tablets. Directly related to 
this is the rise of social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter. They can play a positive 
role in anti-terrorism: they can be used by passengers to alert authorities of suspicious 
activity, or by authorities to alert passengers in case of an emergency. On the other hand, one 
Canadian terrorism expert cautioned “cellphones and the network signals used to connect 
them are common tools for terrorists, particularly when it comes to the detonation of 
explosives and the communication it takes to pull off such crimes requiring conspiracy” 
(Davidson, 2012). He cited the London and Madrid attacks as specific examples; the British 
government said “careful use of mobile phones” contributed to 7/7, and mobiles were used to 
detonate the explosives in the Madrid attacks (Davidson, 2012).  
Another option would something like weapons-sniffing dogs, briefly mentioned 
earlier. In 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security passed a measure including a 
provision that “bomb-sniffing dogs will monitor passengers and baggage during special 
events or if threats emerge” (Stein, 2004, p.17). Dogs are part of the aforementioned TSA-
VIPR teams (Patterson, 2012). However, dogs likely could not be used as a deterrent in every 
station; there are almost 300 stations each in the London underground and Paris metro, 101 
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each in Vienna and Milan, 85 in Frankfurt, 166 in Barcelona (Schwandl, 2012). Again, the 
logistics would likely make this method impossible, or at least quite limited. That being said, 
they could still be useful on occasion. 
Garfinkle is one expert who feels the biggest security concern for transit systems is 
biological and chemical weapons. He warns “we need to devise ways to better control the 
uses of bioscience in our own country and internationally. We need an international regime 
to both monitor and set standards for bioscience research” (2008, p.417). Since so many 
biological and chemical agents are of a dual-use nature – meaning they have positive medical 
or scientific effects in addition to negative ones – he has a point. Houston has implemented 
what is called the “Breathe Safe System,” technology that kills almost 100% of some types of 
bacteria. “The primarily goal is hygienic: preventing the spread of viruses such H1N1, 
bacteria, or mold,” according to Parker. “But,” he adds, “the technology is also evolving to 
prevent against a biological attack on a mass transit system” (2010). A security feature 
sought by Washington’s Metro after 9/11 was “an expanded chemical sensor program” 
(Waugh, 2004, p.312). Senator Lieberman advocated sensors “that automatically detect 
chemical, biological and explosive threats” (Stoller, 2010).  
However, it is difficult to get ahold of biological or chemical weapons in lethal 
quantities, and there is little past precedence for their use in successful terrorist attacks other 
than sarin in Tokyo; explosives seem to remain the preferred method used by terrorists. Since 
the previous ways suggested all have weaknesses, one way of narrowing it down could be 
profiling. However, it would almost be impossible to get away with that legally, not to 
mention the myriad ethical concerns that it would raise. Security expert Paul Cornish 
mentioned a new “super-fast profiling on transport” mechanisms in his class in November 
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2009, so it is clear innovations continue to be made (Cornish, 2012). However, as Murphy 
points out, “Besides the civil liberties questions, there's a basic problem with targeted 
searches: The targets know they've been tagged… You know if you've been questioned. You 
know if you're asked to stand in a special line. You know if you've been frisked. All of this 
open scrutiny makes it possible to learn an anti-profile to defeat [the screening system]” 
(2005). As such, blatant profiling is also unlikely to be a realistic solution. 
Finally, besides changes in passenger behavior, official policy, and station design, 
Chalk says that new train car designs, too, can make transit safer: “Retrofitting rail cars with 
pop-off roofs and pop-out windows to dissipate explosive shockwaves, although expensive,” 
he says, “would certainly help” (Chalk, 2006). The key word in his comment is expensive; as 
with so many things, transit security needs large amounts of funding. Yet, again as with so 
many things, funding is a contentious issue, especially in tough economic times.  It is 
important to remember that “investments in these types of technologies must always be 
considered in light of the safeguards that can be reasonably achieved and at what expense” 
(Chalk, 2006). James Carafano of the conservative American think tank The Heritage 
Foundation said mass transit networks “would consume every cent we spend on homeland 
security, and there still would be vast vulnerabilities” (Stoller, 2010).  
Nevertheless, mass transit receives relatively little amounts of funding. William 
Millar, president of the American Public Transportation Association, explains “subway, 
passenger rail, cargo rail, bus, and some ferry security” has been given under $2 billion in 
federal funding since 9/11; aviation well over $15 billion (Stein, 2004, p.17; Stoller, 
2010).This discrepancy concerns Congressmen like Bennie Thompson, chairman of the U.S. 
House Committee on Homeland Security, and Jim Turner, who in 2004 proposed new 
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legislation that would allocate almost $3 billion over three years for improving transit 
security (Stein, 2004, p.17). A month after 9/11,  Senator John McCain introduced the Rail 
Transportation Safety and Security Act, “which would have increased penalties for attacking 
or threatening to attack freight and passenger trains and funded security upgrades ranging 
from more guards to surveillance equipment” (Waugh, 2004, p.312) 
McCain’s proposal did not pass, though, and the U.S continued to focus largely on 
aviation security. Many feel the same as Ron Heil, a security consultant for transportation 
industry firm TranSystems: “The airplane can be used as a weapon of mass destruction, such 
as in the 9/11 attacks, and there is no recovering from even a small blast at 40,000 feet… 
Trains must travel on rails, making them hard to steer into other targets but easy to attack 
externally on their routes” (Stoller, 2010). So, even though more people ride mass transit, 
airplanes have higher potential to create larger amounts of casualties. However, it must be 
noted that there could be costs other than just human lives; a report by the Metropolitan 
Transit Authority in New York “revealed that an explosion and a breach in the many subway 
tunnels that run under Manhattan's East River could shut down the tunnels for years” and 
cause incredibly large numbers of casualties (Ross, 2009); this is just one hypothetical 
example. 
7/7 was something that finally got the attention of the U.S. government, though. In 
the weeks leading up to July 2005, the Senate was considering reduced funding for mass 
transit security; after 7/7, some congressmen pointed out how important transit security was. 
According to Senator Chuck Schumer, “It is clear that we're not doing close to enough and 
must do more… The soft underbelly of buses and subways and railroads are fully exposed to 
similar terrorist attacks” (Murray, 2005). The national bus carrier Greyhound said they would 
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“screen all passengers if a bill sponsored by Senator Max Cleland” was passed; “Greyhound 
would use contractors to screen passengers for weapons with handheld wands at the 
company's roughly 200 staffed terminals” (Peckenbaugh, 2002, p.75).  
Ultimately, though, the Senate was did not reach a deal, and rejected proposed 
increases on the mass transit budget of the Department of Homeland Security (Lipton, 2005). 
In fact, the new budget appropriated $50 million less than 2004, with Bush’s Homeland 
Security secretary Michael Chertoff emphasizing the need for aviation security instead, in 
spite of the fact that up to that point, $250 million (with an m) had been spent on transit 
whereas $15 billion (with a b) on aviation. Echoing previous sentiments, Chertoff said “a 
fully loaded airplane with jet fuel… has the capacity to kill 3,000 people. A bomb in a 
subway car may kill 30 people” (Lipton, 2005). 
As a result, most security funding for mass transit has been left up to state and local 
authorities. In financially-distressed places – like most any American or European city in 
recent years – this can lead to severe budgetary constraints. In April 2010, the American 
Public Transportation Association released a report saying America’s mass transit networks 
“are facing unprecedented funding challenges due to widespread declining state and local 
revenues” (Stoller, 2010). William Millar, American Public Transportation Association 
president, emphasized the need for national support: “State and local governments and transit 
agencies are doing what they can to improve security, but it is important that the federal 
government be a full partner in the effort” (Murray, 2005). On the other hand, the 
aforementioned Chertoff, then-Secretary of Homeland Security, said “I think our transit 
systems are safe,” adding “I wouldn't make a policy decision driven by a single event,” 
without sensing the irony given his position (Murray, 2005). 
30 
 
All things considered, perhaps the best idea is to “keep calm and carry on,” as the 
cliché goes. It is important to have emergency systems in place in advance; escape routes, 
CERT, etc. Mainly, just be prepared for as many potential scenarios as possible. This would 
ideally lessen panic and chaos among citizens, responders, and civic authorities, as well as 
keep casualties to a minimum.  If a terrorist can cause long-term disruption to the lives of 
millions, they might consider that a victory. The terrorist group may only strike once, but the 
effects on the populace can be long-lasting; for example, the 9/11 attacks occurred over a 
decade ago, but the hassle and inconvenience of the consequent increased security measures 
at airports is still extant to this day, as has been mentioned. 9/11 has cost the American 
economy some $123 billion dollars over the past eleven years, according to Kenny, who says 
“these days, the TSA’s major role appears to be to make plane trips more unpleasant” (2012). 
The important thing is to not let everyday life be disrupted in the long-term. Said one 
New York commuter: “Every day, I see the NYPD out here. I see the dogs. I can’t let it affect 
my life right now… I don’t think about terrorism. I only think about it when I hear about it. 
Other than that, it never enters my mind” (Weber, 2010). Even after mass casualty events, 
sometimes transit networks can be remarkably resilient. Cox, Prager, and Rose look at the 
role resilience plays in overcoming attacks: though it may not be possible to prevent all 
terrorism, “by augmenting a security strategy of prevention and detection with a strategy of 
encouraging transportation network resilience, we can reduce the consequences of an 
unforeseen attack on the transportation system” (2009, p.308). Perhaps the best example of 
transit resilience is a chilling anecdote provided by Robert Krulwich, explaining the tale of 
Tsutomu Yamaguchi following the atomic bomb blast in Hiroshima, August 1945: 
“With nowhere to go and desperate to get away from the destruction and the 
burned bodies, [Yamaguchi] heard a rumor the railroad might still be working. 
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He decided to head for the train station, which was across a river. The bridges 
were down. He tried crawling across a logjam of corpses, but couldn't cross, 
then found a single railroad beam and made it to the other side, where, 
amazingly, trains were indeed leaving for other cities. He pushed himself onto 
one heading southwest to his hometown: Nagasaki” (2012). 
 
VI. Conclusions    
As sustainability becomes an increasingly important component of the world, cities 
learn improving their transit structure is essential to keep up with the pace set by global 
trendsetters. At the same time, new security concerns must be properly addressed for this to 
be effective. Over the past few decades, Western cities in particular have become susceptible 
targets of global terrorist organisations, and security against the ever-present threat of 
terrorism has become one of the key drivers of policy-making at both the domestic and 
international level in that time, especially since 9/11, 7/7, and other attacks (some successful, 
some not) brought in the twenty-first century. No type of travel has been immune to security 
risks, especially those types which concentrate many people together in compact spaces, such 
as airplanes, subway and light rail carriages, and buses. 
In response, increased security measures have been implemented by both the private 
and the public sector at various levels.  For example, “installing more closed-circuit 
television cameras, increasing the presence of security, both visible and undercover, and 
adding bomb-sniffing dog teams are all options that security experts sometimes recommend” 
(Gollom, 2012), as well as the other options mentioned herein, such as public awareness 
programs and changing the designs of transit stations. There have been a few notable tragic 
exceptions, but for the most part, traveling on mass transit can be considered as safe as ever. 
However…will any of this be enough? One Madrid transportation official claimed 
“Security does not exist. What do exist are methods to lessen insecurity. You never know 
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what is going to happen. I am telling you this because when the politicians tell you that these 
methods will guarantee our security, it is all false” (Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and Fink, 
2006, p.743).  Jennifer Dorn of the Federal Transit Administration thinks “completely 
preventing terrorist attacks on public transportation systems is an unrealistic goal,” a 
sentiment she told the U.S. Senate in the months following 9/11: “Given the inherently open 
nature of our transit system, it is more important to concentrate on mitigation than 
prevention, frankly” (Peckenbaugh, 2002, p.74). This idea was echoed by Chalk, who said 
“attempting to institute 100 percent security is impossible given the nature and purpose of 
mass transit” (2006). 
Regardless, with so much information floating around, it is essential for the right 
people to be informed. However, this is sometimes easier said than done. Referring to the 
logistical trouble of sharing information from the FBI, CIA, DHS, etc. one character in the 
show Criminal Minds said “it sure would be a lot easier if there was centralisation of all of 
this” (Criminal Minds, 2006). Though the show is fictional, her concerns are valid in real 
life. The problem is not limited to the United States; in Britain, transit operators – like the 
London Underground or Nexus in Newcastle/Sunderland – secure the trains, whereas 
Network Rail secures stations (Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and Fink, 2006, p.736).  
Likewise, it is just as important to cooperate internationally as well as domestically, 
especially in this globalised era. As with any multinational problem, it is necessary for 
relevant parties to share ideas and solutions across borders. Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and 
Fink emphasize that security cannot “be achieved without global cooperation and worldwide 
networking” (2006, p.727). It is essential for cities to learn best practices from others; to 
work on “building a smarter planet,” as the IBM catchphrase goes. According to transit 
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engineer David Levinson, “Understanding how subway networks grow and evolve might one 
day help to design better systems” (Fecht, 2012). Loukaitou-Sideris, Taylor, and Fink 
provide a specific example, saying “all of the British transit operators we interviewed 
stressed the importance of sharing information and knowledge about security with their 
neighbors on the Continent” (2006, p.737). To fight a multinational problem, there must be a 
multinational effort. 
There likely is no perfect solution, as there will always be some degree of risk given 
the open nature of mass transit. However, by using a comparative approach to security threats 
on public transportation systems and learning from others, relevant parties can figure out 
what some of the best practices are to ensure that people remain as safe as possible. Civic 
authorities, companies in the private sector, and public citizens all need to be prepared for 
what they would do in an attack situation; by having plans and preventative measures in 
place in advance, casualties can be minimized, services can be restored quicker, and 
passengers can feel more secure. That is really the best thing that can be done.   
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